We consider a bilateral monopoly wherein a manufacturer can open its direct channel that is less efficient than the existing retailer. We show the following results. The manufacturer opens its direct channel if its bargaining power over the existing retailer is weak. In a quantity competition, opening the direct channel is detrimental to social welfare if the direct channel's inefficiency level is low, but beneficial to social welfare if the inefficiency level is high. In a price competition with horizontally differentiated channels, opening the direct channel is detrimental to social welfare if the direct channel's inefficiency level is high.
Introduction
Manufacturers often open their own direct channels to expand accessibility to consumers even when they indirectly sell products through traditional retail channels. Owing to the tougher downstream competition in those markets, such introductions of direct channels intuitively seem welfare-improving, although existing retailers that trade with those manufacturers fall into difficulties to maintain profits as large as before.
1 Such a positive effect of manufacturers' direct channels on welfare seems more likely to hold if a manufacturer's direct channel is an efficient one. This fact has put policymakers in a dilemma of whether opening a direct channel should be given policy support from the perspective of social welfare or legally restrained to protect existing retailers' benefits (Kalnins, 2004 ).
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Because of the common expectation of a positive impact of opening a direct channel on welfare (Dutta et al., 1999; Blair and Lafontaine, 2005) , the welfare magnitude of this important issue has not been theoretically considered in the economics literature, except for the recent study by Pan (2018) , who considers an ex ante downstream duopoly wherein two retailers are offered take-it-or-leave-it contracts secretly from a monopoly manufacturer. 3 The main focus of Pan (2018) is to show that opening a direct channel may result in higher price and lower consumer surplus although the negative impact of 1 Existing retailers treat such introductions of direct channels as an "encroachment." This terminology is often used by researchers in marketing and operations research in the context of vertical channel. 2 Some theoretical studies even show that such an introduction of a direct channel does not always harm existing retailers (see Arya et al., 2007; Matsushima and Mizuno, 2018) . These studies provide theoretical support for the positive effect of opening a direct channel on existing retailers. 3 This market structure is extensively discussed in the literature on supplier opportunism. The main finding is that under such a structure, the upstream monopolist faces a commitment problem in that it fails to achieve a monopoly outcome (e.g., Hart and Tirole, 1990; McAfee and Schwartz, 1994; Reisinger and Tarantino, 2015) .
opening a direct channel on social welfare is also discussed in his concluding remarks.
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A manufacturer opens a direct channel so as to solve commitment problem plays a key role in Pan (2018) , meaning that the counterintuitive result is driven by two important elements: (i) the ex ante downstream duopoly of existing retail channels and (ii) contract secrecy. Specifically, in Pan (2018) , opening a direct channel may reduce social welfare because it changes the market outcomes from an ex ante duopoly to an ex post quasi-monopoly. 5 Moreover, he does not discuss the impact of opening a direct channel on existing retailers because their ex ante and ex post profits are always zero owing to take-it-or-leave-it offers.
In this study, we consider a manufacturer-retailer (bilateral monopoly) relation so that the manufacturer's commitment problem is no longer a concern. A bargaining problem is also considered so that the pros and cons of opening a direct channel can be tracked from the perspectives of all the players. Further, the ex ante market status is a bilateral monopoly in our study, implying that our result is motivated by a different and new mechanism than in Pan (2018).
We consider a bilateral monopoly where a manufacturer can open its direct channel which is less efficient than the existing retailer. A two-part tariff contract is considered.
We need to compare two cases: (i) the manufacturer does not open its direct channel and (ii) it opens its direct channel, inducing a downstream duopoly. In the second case, we consider both quantity and price competition. Pan (2018) . 5 We call the ex post status a quasi-monopoly because it is exactly a monopoly only when selling directly is as efficient as selling via existing retailers.
In the first case, the manufacturer and retailer decide their contract terms through Nash bargaining, inducing them to set the unit price at the manufacturer's marginal production cost in equilibrium. In the second case, the bargaining partners maximize their joint profit including the profit of the manufacturer's direct channel, which distorts the unit price in equilibrium. This is because the trading pair needs to balance the volume of supply in both the direct and indirect channels by controlling the unit price.
Under a quantity competition, we first show that the manufacturer opens its direct channel if its bargaining power over the existing retailer is weak. We further show that opening the manufacturer's direct channel is detrimental to social welfare if the direct channel's inefficiency level is low, but beneficial to social welfare if the inefficiency level is high.
The welfare property is a novelty of our study. The intuition is as follows. When the manufacturer decides the quantity in the direct channel, it neglects the impact on the indirect channel's quantity, inducing a standard asymmetric Cournot duopoly outcome. Hence, the unit price becomes the only strategic tool for the trading pair to balance shares in different channels. If the direct channel's inefficiency level is low, to maximize the joint profit, the trading pair needs to significantly restrict the indirect channel's quantity through a high unit price, leading to a large supply volume in the direct channel which is still less efficient than the indirect channel. The restriction on the indirect channel's supply becomes stronger as the inefficiency level of the direct channel grows lower. On the other hand, if the direct channel's inefficiency level is high such that the market share of the direct channel is small enough, the manufacturer would give a subsidy to the indirect channel, leading to a large total quantity.
Under a price competition wherein the direct and indirect channels are horizontally differentiated, we first show a similar condition that the manufacturer opens its direct channel. We then show that opening the manufacturer's direct channel is detrimental to social welfare if the direct channel's inefficiency level is high, contrasting with the welfare property in the quantity competition.
Contrary to the quantity competition, under a price competition, the manufacturer's price directly affects the indirect channel's share, which improves the effectiveness of balancing shares in different channels through the unit price. The manufacturer thus does not need to subsidize the indirect channel even if its direct channel's inefficiency level is high, which is in sharp contrast with the result in the quantity competition.
Therefore, opening a direct channel always results in a higher unit price, which diminishes social welfare.
The above outcomes have some important policy implications. The realized market share of a manufacturer who opens a direct channel may not be adequate as an indicator to evaluate the ex post welfare change. Specifically, a small ex post market share of the direct channel may indicates a welfare-enhancing direct channel entry and a negative unit price in a quantity competition, but a welfare-reducing direct channel entry and a positive unit price in a price competition. That is, the relations between the welfare effect of manufacturer's direct channel opening and the direct channel's market share are completely reverse under the two competition modes. Despite this, we could say that the manufacturer's direct channel opening tends to be harmful only if the input price in the indirect channel is strictly positive. This implies that it would be better for competition authorities to pay more attention to the claim by an existing retailer that trades with a manufacturer with a direct channel if the claim is based on an increase in its unit price. This is another novelty of our study.
Besides Pan (2018) , another closely related study is Reisinger and Tarantino (2015) .
A monopoly manufacturer that secretly supplies two competing retailers with asymmet-ric marginal costs in a take-it-or-leave-it manner (downstream duopoly) faces a commitment problem. The authors study the manufacturer's incentive for vertical integration in solving this problem. The main finding is that when the manufacturer chooses to integrate with the inefficient retailer, it will subsidize the other efficient retailer to optimally reallocate the channel distribution. 6 This finding implies that vertical integration is welfare-improving (welfare-reducing) if and only if the degree of subsidization is high (low). This setting is similar to ours in that a manufacturer's direct channel opening can also be comprehended as downward integration with an inactive retailer.
However, in Reisinger and Tarantino (2015), integration with the inefficient retailer rather than the efficient one is always suboptimal for the manufacturer, implying that the welfare-reducing impact of vertical integration can only happen off the equilibrium path. 7 Conversely, our study offers a new insight that the welfare-reducing downward entry may actually happen in equilibrium.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides the model setting.
Section 3 shows the analytical outcomes of the model in a quantity competition. Section 4 presents the welfare property of the outcomes in Section 3. Section 5 discusses a price competition. Section 6 concludes.
Model
Let us first consider a monopoly supply chain that comprises one upstream manufacturer U and one downstream retailer D. U supplies final products to D that then resells them 6 The Nash bargaining setting is also considered in the web appendix of Reisinger and Tarantino (2015). 7 As an extension of their model, by incorporating marginal cost uncertainty, they show that both downstream retailers can be chosen by the manufacturer as a partner for vertical integration.
to consumers. U can also choose whether to directly supply to consumers through a direct channel. We assume that D incurs no cost in the reselling process. On the contrary, when U opens a direct channel, it incurs a positive marginal cost for retailing c. 8 For simplicity, U 's production cost is normalized to zero.
The trading term between U and D is determined through a negotiation over a two-part tariff contract comprising a unit price w and a fixed fee f . The negotiation outcome is decided by the Nash bargaining solution. 9 The bargaining power of U over D is β ∈ (0, 1). We assume that U 's direct channel and D supply homogeneous final products in the retail market.
10 Denote D's quantity by q D and U 's by q U (if it directly sells). We assume that the inverse demand function P (Q) for final products is nonnegative, strictly decreasing, and twice differentiable, where P is the price and Q is the total quantity sold in the retail market. To guarantee that profit functions are strictly quasi-concave and that resale competition involves strategic substitutability, we
The game proceeds as follows. In stage 1, U chooses whether to open a direct channel. In stage 2, U and D negotiate over the two-part tariff contract. In stage 3, if U opened a direct channel in stage 1, D and U simultaneously set their own quantities; 8 The assumption that retailers are more efficient than manufacturers is common in the literature.
Such an efficiency gap occurs for various reasons. For example, in competition between bricks-andmortar retailers and manufacturers' online stores, the latter are less familiar with consumers' preferences than the former, which benefit from direct contact (Arya et al., 2007) . Moreover, the latter incur higher transportation costs by shipping directly to consumers, whereas the former benefit from bulk shipping (Li et al., 2015) . Further, the latter must risk returns and redress because consumers cannot physically inspect products before ordering (Pan, 2016 otherwise, only D sets its own quantity.
The timeline in which U 's decision of opening a direct channel comes before the contracting process follows the idea that starting a direct channel is relatively irreversible and thus must be taken prudently. For example, to conduct direct sales, U has to deal with resale issues such as inventory and siting locations, which are always regarded as long-term decisions. Specifically, as noted by Hulland et al. (2007) , when a direct channel is operated in the form of an online channel where labor with IT technology skills is a prerequisite, a lot of prior investments need to be done in advance. The better preparation in constructing an online channel, the better performance a firm will have.
Analysis
The game is solved by backward induction. Based on U 's decision in stage 1, there are two types of subgames: U opens a direct channel or not. We use the superscripts o ("open") and n ("not") to denote each subgame. Note that the Nash bargaining process naturally guarantees that the negotiation between U and D succeeds in equilibrium and that U does not foreclose D because D is more efficient than U 's direct channel.
U does not open a direct channel
First, we discuss the subgame wherein U does not open a direct channel. In stage 3,
given the unit price assigned in stage 2, D sets quantity q to maximize its profit:
To simplify the notation, we define the industry profit as Π M (w) ≡ P (q(w))q(w), where the superscript M represents the integrated monopoly. 11 Anticipating the outcome in stage 3, U and D know that if the negotiation succeeds, they can obtain
On the contrary, if the negotiation breaks down, both of them obtain zero profits.
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The negotiation in stage 2 specifies the contract as follows:
The first-order condition can be denoted as follows:
leading to
The corresponding profits of U and D are
This result is standard. With a two-part tariff contract, U always sets the unit price to its production cost (zero) and abstracts D's surplus through the fixed fee based on its bargaining power.
U opens a direct channel
Next, let us consider the subgame wherein U opens a direct channel. In this case, it sells through both D and its direct channel. The following maximization problems in
leading to the subgame quantities: q D (w, c) and q U (w, c). We define the industry profit as follows (we use the superscript I to represent it):
If the negotiation succeeds, they can obtain
On the contrary, if the negotiation breaks down, U has a disagreement payoff in which it directly sells and monopolizes the retail market with marginal cost c, although D gains zero profit. The profits of U and D in the negotiation breakdown are given as
The bargaining problem in stage 2 is given as
Owing to the bargaining procedure, they set w as if they maximize their joint profit through the control of w and split the maximized joint profit through fixed fee f . By using the envelop theorem, we derive the first-order condition of w:
In addition to the first term of Eq. 
Lemma 1 The optimal q D is given by
Proof. The first-order condition of U 's direct selling in stage 3 is given by
Totally differentiating Eq. (5) gives rise to
By using Eq. (6), the maximization problem in Eq. (3) can be derived as
Substituting Eq. (6) into the last equation gives rise to the expression in Lemma 1.
Because of strategic substitutability, q D is positive. D is possibly offered either a tax or a subsidy in a bilateral monopoly with a two-part tariff contract. Given that U has committed to open a direct channel, when its direct channel is efficient, it would rather restrain D's sales and shift some share back to U 's direct channel. On the other hand, when the efficiency advantage in the indirect channel is large enough, U tends to restrain its own sale and promote the indirect channel.
Lemma 1 implies that as long as
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In Reisinger and Tarantino (2015), when a manufacturer supplies duopoly retailers with asymmetric marginal costs and the manufacturer integrates with the less efficient retailer, the more efficient one will be offered a subsidy. Although this result is similar to Lemma 2, their finding is essentially different to ours because we consider the case wherein the manufacturer creates a new retailer (i.e., a direct channel) instead of integrating with an incumbent one. In other words, the baseline situation in Reisinger and Tarantino (2015) is an asymmetric downstream duopoly with a monopoly manufacturer, whereas that in our study is a bilateral monopoly with the possibility of opening a direct channel. Moreover, in our study, the manufacturer's decision on whether to open a direct channel is explicitly considered and the subsidy can exist in the subgame perfect equilibrium. This part is discussed after we derive Proposition 1.
U 's incentive to open a direct channel
Given a certain w o that satisfies Eq. (2), the corresponding profits in this subgame can be denoted as
To restrict our attention to the parameter range wherein opening a direct channel 13 In all studies modeling a linear contract, the unit price must reduce after U 's entry (e.g., Arya et al., 2007); by contrast, in all research that models a two-part tariff contract, the unit price must increase after U 's entry (e.g., Matsushima and Mizuno, 2018; Pan, 2018 
Compared with the monopoly case with zero marginal cost, the industry profit of the duopoly case with one agent having a positive marginal cost (i.e., c > 0) is strictly lower, no matter how U chooses w o . In other words, an efficiency loss at the industry level is inevitable. Hence, the first term of Eq. (7) is always negative. On the contrary, when c <ĉ, the second term must be positive. 14 Therefore, whether U opens a direct channel is decided by U 's bargaining power, which is summarized in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 Given that c <ĉ, U opens a direct channel when its bargaining power
is relatively small. Formally,
. opens its direct channel:
Proposition 2 For a small c, dβ(c)/dc < 0.
Proof.
To verify the sign of Eq (8) 
By continuity, it suffices to confirm the case when c = 0. At c = 0, dΠ
Welfare
We check the impact of U 's direct channel on the social welfare and consumer surplus.
Notice that all welfare analyses will be carried out with β satisfying the inequality in Proposition 1. As will be shown below, all of our results are independent of β, so they can exist as equilibrium outcomes.
The social welfare and consumer surplus are denoted by
The next proposition summarizes how the existence of a direct channel affects welfare and consumer surplus when c is small.
Proposition 3 For a small c, the presence of U 's direct channel is detrimental to social
welfare, but beneficial to consumer surplus. 
At c = 0,
where q M is the monopoly quantity in which the marginal cost is zero. 15 Using Eqs.
(11), (12) and Eq. (5) at c = 0, we obtain
The intuition of Proposition 3 can be understood as follow. Firstly, a small c will result in a higher q U in the direct channel, which is a first-order effect. Moreover, according to Eqs. (2) and (4), a small c will motivate U to charge a high w, which implies that there is a second-order effect to further raise q U . Hence, when c is small, the market share of U 's direct channel is large, implying that the relatively inefficient channel handles most retailing. This inefficient allocation of supply worsens the social welfare.
Next, we discuss the case wherein c is so large that U is almost inactive in retailing, or namely c is close toĉ such that q U (ĉ) = 0. How social welfare and consumer surplus are affected by the existence of a direct channel is summarized by the next proposition:
Proposition 4 For a relatively large c, the presence of U 's direct channel is beneficial
to both social welfare and consumer surplus. By substituting q U = 0 into Eq. (2), we have
Proof. By continuity, it suffices to prove
Proposition 4 follows from a mechanism opposite to that in Proposition 3. Specifically, a relatively large c not only results in a small q U , but also motivates U to subsidize D to further promote the share in the indirect channel. Hence, even though the direct channel becomes an inefficient one in this case, the relatively efficient channel, namely the indirect one, handles most retailing, which means an efficient allocation.
Notice that the presence of the direct channel always increases consumer surplus when c is either small or large, which differs from Pan (2018) who demonstrates that a manufacturer's direct channel reduces consumer surplus when c is small. 16 Moreover, the manufacturer's direct channel inducing D being either levied a tax when c is small or subsidized when c is large implies that D may either benefit or be hurt from U 's direct selling. 17 This finding implies that an increase in w can be a signal that the presence of a direct channel is welfare-reducing and that the competition authority should consider a claim by an existing retailer that trades with a manufacturer who also directly sells if the claim is based on an increase in its unit price. 16 Pan and Yoshida (2018) consider an international oligopoly wherein domestic manufacturers compete with foreign manufacturers who carry out FDI and sell foreign-made products directly through e-commerce sites. In that study, foreign manufacturers' cost disadvantage in direct selling is captured by a specific tariff. Although similar in market structure, Pan and Yoshida (2018) focus on the case wherein direct selling happens, which is one subgame in our study. 17 This also differs from Pan (2018) who considers a take-it-or-leave-it contract offered by a monopoly manufacturer so that the incumbent retailers always have zero profits. 
We impose the following assumptions:
We first check how w o affects the retail prices. In the final stage, the first-order conditions are given as
The total differentials of the first-order conditions are given as
where
where the last inequality is the Routh-Hurwitz stability condition (Hinloopen, 2015) .
The second terms in Eqs. (21) and (22) correspond to U 's strategic incentives to earn profits from the indirect channel through w. Under the assumptions, both dp D /dw and dp U /dw are positive. Intuitively, raising w will increase both p D and p U owing to U 's incentive to increase its indirect profit and the strategic complementarity between p D and p U . 
Because both p D and p U increase in w, the presence of the direct channel generates positive effects on w in both direct and indirect channels. This implies that when U directly sells, U always charges D a tax, which is summarized by the following lemma:
The above fact substantially differs from the quantity competition case wherein D is subsidized for a relatively large c. Proof. We first prove that dQ U /dc < 0. By totally differentiating Eqs. (17) and (18), we have dp
dp D dc = dp D dp U dp U dc
From the stability of equilibrium, 0 < dp D dc < dp U dc .
Because
In addition, there exist ac such that for c ≥c, Q U = 0. 
where p D =p D is the threshold value with which Q U (p U , p D ) = 0. Hence,
The intuition is as follow. In the price competition, U 's strategic variable p U has a direct impact on D's quantity, while its strategic variable in the quantity competition, q U , does not. Here, U can control the share in its direct and indirect share through p U , without bearing a revenue loss in the indirect channel caused by lowering w o . Therefore, even though U is almost inactive in direct selling as c approachesc, the indirect channel handles retailing in an inefficient way, which causes a welfare loss.
Conclusion
We consider a bilateral monopoly model in which an upstream manufacturer that trades 
